Explaining Transitional Representation:  
The Rise and Fall of Women of Russia

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In 1993, the Women of Russia (WR) party won unexpected vote support 
Russia’s first multi-party competitive elections. Just two years later, the party 
lost almost half of its vote share and fell below the five percent electoral 
threshold. As a result, the party splintered and although it gained ballot access 
in 1999 it managed to secure less than two percent of the national vote. 
Since that time, no women’s party has competed in national parliamentary 
elections. Conventional wisdom argues that the WR was ineffective in the 
national parliament, the State Duma and therefore alienated voters. Using a 
new technology to analyze legislative decision-making, we argue that WR’s 
irrelevance in legislative decision-making was more a function of party 
system structure than poor leadership or lack of political strategy. The 
argument presented in the paper not only has implications for the evolution 
of transitional representation in Russia but also for a more general theory of 
which parties survive founding elections to occupy permanent places in the 
party systems of new democracies.

One the most unexpected outcomes resulting from the introduction 
elections of post-Communist states was the emergence of women’s parties 
in very disparate contexts. Largely built on the legacy of Communist-era, 
these parties translated their institutional legacies into political organizations. 
Yet, despite these promising starts, women’s parties either failed to attract 
significant voter support or more disappointingly, failed to capitalize on initial 
electoral successes and quickly faded from the political landscape. This early 
rise and rapid failure of women’s parties raises an important puzzle in the 
formation of political party systems in transition studies.


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This paper attacks this puzzle by exploring the fate of the Russian party, Women of Russia (WR) against the backdrop of the evolving party system. WR emerged in the snap election of 1993, to capture eight percent of the vote and an extremely unexpected fourth place showing in the electoral horse race. In the next election in 1995, the party’s support dwindled to 4.6 percent, below the five percent threshold necessary to secure seats in the legislature. As a result, the party’s faction in the legislature declined to just three representatives elected in single member districts. In the subsequent year, the party quickly splintered and it has not successfully won seats since that loss.

The trajectory of WR and other gender-based electoral blocs in the post-Communist space raises an important question related to theories of regime consolidation: which parties are mostly likely to survive the first few rounds of electoral competition in a new regime given the challenge of a rapidly changing electoral environment between founding elections and the next election cycle. In founding elections, only parties rooted in the incumbent authoritarian regime can attract votes on the basis of their policy achievements. As a result, new parties often resort to appeals based in symbolic and descriptive representation to attract votes. Yet, if these new parties are successful, they are immediately challenged to participate the legislative policy process and afforded the opportunity to shape policy outcomes. Given this mandate, the logic of electoral linkage between voters and parties may shift as partisan voters expect their representatives to secure policy outcomes that are consistent with their preferences. While some organizations, such as gender-based or ethnic parties, might continue to appeal to voters on the basis of descriptive representation, their ability to do so is also shaped by their participation in the legislative policy process.

Moreover, since legislative decision-making involves interaction among parties, an individual party’s capacity to shape policy outcomes may be limited by its size, position in the policy space and ability to enforce discipline. Research on majority rule decision-making demonstrates a party’s ability to influence policy is largely shaped by the configuration of preferences embodied with the legislative party system. These constraints predicted by a theory of majority rule that is described by the game-theoretic solution concept the uncovered set or UCS. Until recently, the inability to measure a party’s influence on policy precluded political scientists from characterizing the ways in which majority rule advantages one party over another in the policy process. Relying on a new measure of party relevance drawn from research on the UCS, this paper constitutes a first step in characterizing the how majority rule limits the voter linkage strategies available to parties in the period following founding elections by exploring the unique case of the Women of Russia organization.

The paper begins with a review of the history of the WR organization and the conditions of Russia’s founding elections. The next section develops an explanation for WR’s inability to maintain vote support in the subsequent elections that focuses on the changing capacity of the party to forge ties to voters based on different modes or logics of representation that are rooted in competing linkage mechanisms between voters and party organizations. Finally, we rely on a new measure of party relevance to show that given the structure of the party system, majority rule decision-making processes disadvantaged WR and limited the party’s policy relevance. This analysis provides a supply-side or party-centric argument for why half of its voters abandoned the party in the next election. We conclude with some of the questions and general implications raised by this interesting, yet limited, case study.

The Rise and Fall of Women of Russia

In September 1991, the long impasse that had existed between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his polarized legislature came to a head over the direction of economic reform. The president dissolved the legislature and called new elections. In response, the legislature refused to step down and occupied the parliament building, known as the White House. In what became known as the self-coup or second putsch, Mr. Yeltsin ordered a military attack on the legislative holdouts and arrested the parliamentary leadership.

In the wake of the violence, Yeltsin called new parliamentary elections and used his decree power to promulgate new electoral rules, launching a new phase in Russian democratic consolidation. The complex rules established an electoral structure in which one-half of the seats would be allocated through single member district races and the other half would be awarded through a proportional representation closed-list system. The new law also established a five percent threshold for representation, designed to encourage mergers between small parties. Elections were set on December 13—just two and half months after the dissolution of parliament—leaving little time for political parties to organize.

The snap election conveyed particular advantage to existing organizations, and particularly those that possessed campaign resources. Among the contestants was a new dark-horse political party, Women of Russia (WR). Like many of the post-Soviet political organizations, the Women of Russia party emerged from Soviet-era political institutions—the dual strands of state-sponsored, Soviet-era women’s organizations: the Soviet Women’s Committee and the hierarchic network of women’s councils known as zhensovety or women’s soviets. These two organizations had very different roles in the Soviet system. Organized to mobilize Soviet women against the Nazi invasion in WWII, the Women’s Committee emerged as the Soviet Union’s face to international women’s community. In contrast,
the zhensoyty focused largely on advocacy of women's issues and women's education that manifested at the local level. In the perestroika era, the two organizations merged under a single administration and joint mission and in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the obsolete state-sponsored organizations were restructured to form the independent Union of Russian Women (Buckely 1997, Racioppi and See 1995).

Reflecting its pedigree, the party leadership joined unlikely partners. Alevtina Fedulova, served as the head of the Union of the Women of Russia and was closely tied to the Communist Party although she had often staked out independent positions within the party. In contrast, Ekaterina Lakhova, President Yeltsin’s advisor on children, family, and women’s issues, was more supportive of the radical reform program. Although there were important policy differences between the two women, they provided high-profile leadership for the party and reputations for advocacy on behalf of women struggling in the face of market transition. The party’s campaign platform stressed the need to strengthen the social safety net for women and human rights, equality, and protection from violence. In the polarized landscape of Russia’s party politics, these disparate positions placed the party in centrist camp (Sperling 1999).

Despite these divisions, the legacy of Soviet-era women’s organizations, and their adeptness in the early transition, transferred both a usable past (reputational voter appeals) and portable skills (organization, leadership and mobilization tools) that proved essential to the reconstitute of Communist political parties in other states (Grzymala-Busse 2002). These resources, especially the organizations newspaper and radio outlets as well as their administrative structure in disparate regions, were valuable tools in elections that served to mobilize their party’s predominantly female voters. Overlooking these advantages in political resources, analysts and larger party organizations expected very little of WR in the 1993 election. As a result, its fourth place showing was met with surprise and enthusiasm. Despite its initial success, WR was unable to build on this foundation in the next election and failed to surpass the five percent electoral threshold. As a result, women’s presence in the parliament continued to decline between 1995 and 2007. Data compiled by Moser (2003) shows that the demise of WR marked the beginning of a sharp reduction in women’s election to the Duma. Sixty women (13.7% of the chamber) were elected in 1993 (23 from WR), declining to 46 (10.1%) and 35 (7.8%) in 1999. In 2003, the first year in which no gender-based party competed in the election, the Duma was comprised of 13 percent women. Yet the trend seems short-lived. In 2007, that number increased to 22 percent in part because of a deliberate attempt by the United Russia organization to run ideologically compatible women as candidates for Duma seats (Aivazova 2008).

WR’s early success and then loss of electoral support raises a number of questions about how parties evolve in new regimes, and in particular, about the ways in which electoral success generates new challenges for transitional regime. Consolidation theory generates the expectation that many parties will compete in founding elections but a much smaller number will survive to consolidate into stable actors in the party system. Yet, little work has been done to explain which parties are likely to endure. WR enables us to examine this question, by drawing on competing models of representation to explore how the rigors of the legislative policy process forces parties to adjust their electoral appeals.

Toward a Framework to Explore Transitional Representation: Explaining the Demise of Women of Russia

Most of the explanations for WR’s weak showing in the 1995 parliamentary elections focus on the party’s performance within the legislature. These explanations imply, although do not develop fully; arguments about a failure of representation as the causal mechanism that led core voters to abandon the party. In fact, the consensus explanation for the demise of WR is that the party was mismanaged and could not assert itself in the legislative process. As Jim Richter (1998) writes, “Unfortunately, the bloc proved ineffective within the Duma and failed to gain 5 percent in the 1993 elections, the minimum necessary for representation (p. 161).” Yet, this consensus about the source of WR’s collapse breaks down over what “ineffective” means. Different studies point to distinct pathologies, including a low level of party discipline, high levels of abstentions or absenteeism during key votes, as well as slavish factional support for the President’s agenda. Moreover, none of these theories posit a causal link between legislative ineffectiveness and subsequent vote choice that might be compelling in the chaos of the early consolidation period. Despite these limitations, this view of factional mismanagement persisted found support within the party as WR leader, Lakhova, blamed the party’s loss of vote share on squarely on the strategies of her co-chair, Alevtina Fedulova.

Fedulova countered these charges with a more nuanced explanation for the failure of the party. In a 2003 interview, she claimed that the entire idea of gender-based representation was misguided (Mereu 2003). We follow Fedulova’s logic and argue that a more complete theory of transitional representation would account for both the rapidly evolving nature of political competition in the period of consolidation and also provide a causal logic that links a party’s legislative influence (or lack thereof) to voter responses. Given the focus of our inquiry, we also argue that such a theory must consider the unique nature of the gender-based party organization as distinct from other types of parties.
Theories of political transition bring parties to the center of political systems by their focus on founding elections. According to this theory, reasonably competitive elections entice a disparate set of interests to compete for influence over national policy. Of this initial set of competitors, few survive the first few rounds of competitive elections. In this paper, we take up from this point and ask why Women of Russia was one of the many parties that disappeared from Russia’s nascent political landscape after founding elections, with an eye toward developing a more complete theory to explain which parties endure early rounds of electoral competition and which do not.

Such a theory must begin with the recognition that the mechanisms that encourage vote support for new parties shifts profoundly between founding elections and the second and third electoral cycles. Describing parties’ strategies in the face of founding elections, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) write, “The key to the party’s efficacy…lies in its capacity to generate symbols of partial political identity—around its name, platform, ideology, songs, logo, past and present leadership—which brings together voters and militants across many lines…[p. 58]”. In other words, absent a record of securing policy consistent with voters’ preferences, parties must attract support based on alternative logics, including symbolic and descriptive representation.

The situation facing parties quickly shifts in the lead up to the second election cycle, in large part because successful parties are thrust into the policy process. The very fact that a party has engaged in the legislative decision-making process quickly generates new electioneerig opportunities. In turn, the ability to shape creates the possibility for parties to appeal to voters on the basis of policy influence or what Hannah Pitkin (1967) referred to as substantive representation. The notion of substantive party representation is probably what most people think of when they think about mechanisms that drive vote support for political parties or individual representatives. This type of political representation focuses on the core relationship between representatives and constituents who share policy interests. Successful substantive representation connotes the capacity of a party or individual deputy to influence policy outcomes consistent with the preferences of core constituents. For parties, the collective replaces individual deputies as the purveyor of policy outcomes forging the basis of party-based substantive representation.

Not all parties will adapt voter appeals rooted in policy success. Different parties will face very different challenges in the rapidly changing political environment between election cycles depending on their resources, internal organizational structure, and composition. Parties who won seats in found elections because of their claims about the descriptive representation of social groups, may find it useful to maintain the foundation of those appeals. Yet, these efforts will also be influenced by the party’s engagement in the legislative process. As Jane Mansbridge (1999) suggests, descriptive representation, although rooted in the recognition of resemblance between voter and deputy, rests on the capacity of parliamentarians to fulfill four potential functions: political communication in an untrustworthy environment, the articulation of latent but shared constituent interests, a vehicle through which the group can participate in the policy process and finally the legitimization of group claims of past discrimination. Perhaps most importantly, to fulfill these functions a party that pursues descriptive-based linkages will need to maintain a monopoly over the characteristics that form the basis the linkage. If for example, other parties recruit women to run for office or provide an avenue for women’s participation in the policy process, WR’s claim on the basis of descriptive representation would be weakened. Similarly, if WR is unable to articulate a coherent set of policy positions consistent with its core voters’ preferences then it will likely lose vote support.

WR, or any other party, is not guaranteed success if decides to shift from a descriptive linkages with its core voters to one based in policy since not all parties are equally able to secure policy outcomes. As a generation of research on the effects of majority rule has shown, the opportunities for parties to forge ties to voters on the basis of policy effectiveness are not equal. Although majority rule is normally thought of as a neutral process of decision-making, it conveys significant advantage to some party organizations over others based on their position in the policy space, the size of the party, and the level of party discipline.

To explore the constraints inherent in the majority rule decision-making process, our analysis of a party’s capacity to achieve their preferred policy outcomes relies on the theory of majority rule decision-making captured in the game theoretic concept the uncovered set (UCS). Formally, the uncovered set is the set of outcomes that forward-looking legislators confine themselves to when voting over alternatives in a multi-dimensional policy spaces. In other words, instead of spiraling off into chaos, the use of majority rule leads forward-looking legislators to select outcomes that lie within a limited area of the policy space. This focusing effect occurs because sophisticated decision-makers do not support proposals that they know cannot win (covered outcomes) and, moreover, can use simple agendas to defend outcomes in the uncovered set against opponents who want something else (Shepsle and Weingast 1984).

Prior work has shown that outcomes of majority rule institutions are likely to be constrained by the boundaries of the UCS, an outcome that is in turn constrained by the organization of preferences within the legislature. If voters consider the consequences of their behavior rather than choosing myopically between present alternatives, outcomes of majority rule choice situations will lie in the UCS (Miller 1980; McKelvey 1986; Miller et. al. 1989). Furthermore, for any status quo point, there exists a two-step agenda that

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yields a point in the uncovered set as its final outcome (Shepsle and Weingast 1984). Thus, voters can only secure outcomes within the uncovered set (Cox 1987b). Other work (Banks 1985; McKeelvey 1986) shows that strategic voting and sophisticated agenda control generating a fixed and known agenda, as well as a wide range of other legislative decision processes, including bargaining within and between party coalitions, will lead to outcomes in the UCS.

Our work to date has developed a grid search technique that allows us to estimate the UCS in a real world legislative context (Bianco, Jeliaskov and Sened 2004) and also to demonstrate that it is an accurate predictor of outcomes under majority rule (Bianco, Lynch, Miller and Sened 2006 and 2008). As we show below, building on the concept of the UCS we can explore WR's capacity to perform the functions laid out in the theory of descriptive representation. For example, if the legislative faction of WR exhibits low levels of internal party coherence, then we might argue that it has compromised its ability to reflect the common agenda of core voters. Likewise, if the WR are not distinct from other groups of women deputies in the parliament, then we would argue that their monopoly over the trappings of resemblance between representative and voter is similarly compromised.

In addition, for the first time, the UCS technology described below allows us to measure the party's capacity to shape policy outcomes, a measurement we call party relevance (Kam et. al. 2010). This innovation provides a tool by which we can evaluate the supply-side of the representation linkages—whether or not a party managed to influence the set of possible policy outcomes and how different groups compare on the basis of policy impact. We would argue that if WR is unable to influence policy outcomes—if it is irrelevant in the legislative decision-making process—then its ability to forge credible ties to voters on the basis of substantive representation is also limited.

Using these tools we test some of the key implications of these theories of vote support for political parties rooted in competing theories of representation. We focus on the supply-side, or party basis, for representation, exploring WR's capacity to forge ties with voters based on different logics given their behavior in the parliament, Russia's State Duma. In this paper, we do not explore how voters responded to the behavior, limits and strategies of partisan action in the legislative. Even in the face of these analytic limitations, our results of our analysis shows that given institutional constraints and the rapidly changing environment between founding elections and the second cycle, WR lacked the institutional capacity to attract votes either on the basis of policy or on the basis of resemblance between voters and party deputies.

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<th>Party Non-Voting Scores</th>
<th>Party Coherence Scores</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chaisty</strong></td>
<td><strong>RandS</strong></td>
<td><strong>Scores</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRF</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
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<td>Agrarian Party</td>
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<td>LDPR</td>
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<td>Russia's Choice</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRES</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regional Policy</td>
<td>41%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Democracy Party of Russia</td>
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<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Union of 12th December</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
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*The percent of votes which faction members who did not vote on 140 key votes on economic policy. Reported in Chaisty (2003). Column B reports a measure calculated by Remington and Smith (1995) using a broader set of votes.

**The cohesion rates of parties were produced using the Rice index. This index measures the absolute difference between the percentage of ayes and nays votes within a party, and produces a cohesion scale from 0 (when a party is evenly divided) to 100 (when party members vote unanimously). Reported in Chaisty (2003).

***Calculated using expert survey data, Kitschelt and Smyth 2002.
A simple interpretation of these claims of factional mismanagement is that voters abandoned the party because its leadership mismanaged its legislative faction. One way to test this thesis is to compare WR’s performance relative to other parties in the State Duma. Using comparative measures developed in the literature, Table 1 summarizes some indicators of the party’s legislative behavior relative to other organizations. The first column addresses the charge that the factional members shirked responsibility by not voting on a wide range of key votes. As the table shows, WR members were often absent but this was not a failure of management, rather it reflected a strategy adopted by a number of parties. Under Duma rules, abstentions were often absent but this was not a failure of management, rather it reflected a voting on a wide range of key votes. As the table shows, WR members were often absent but this was not a failure of management, rather it reflected a strategy adopted by a number of parties. Under Duma rules, abstentions were recorded as “no” votes. Parties wanting to abstain resorted to not voting—a sign of protest. Chaisty (2005) reports that the LDPR unanimously failed to vote 18 times over the course of the session. Moreover, as the data show, other parties with similar abstention votes did not suffer similar losses in electoral support.

The second charge often leveled against the party focuses on the low level of party discipline within the faction. The second column measures party discipline by the degree to which the faction voted together throughout the legislative session. Across the board, factional voting was quite high in the Duma with WR falling somewhere in the middle of the pack. Some parties with higher discipline declined in the next round. Others with lower discipline levels survived. Perhaps more importantly, on a number of key issue dimensions such as institutional choice and budgetary politics, WR faction leaders sparked cohesion measures over 90 percent (Haspel 1998). Hence the management of the party was not the central cause of voters’ defections.

The measures of coherence reported in the table are also telling. WR is often characterized as a centrist party using both expert placements and roll call voting analysis (Smyth 2006; Remington 1999). However, this position does not reflect centrist views as much as it reflects the schism in the party over different issue dimensions. For example, on social welfare votes the party resembled the left KPRF and Agrarian parties while on issues of rights and freedoms the party voted with the “radical” right organizations. Thus, WR lacked internal coherence over a complete bundle of issue positions (Kitschelt and Smyth 2002). The lack of coherence was also not particular to WR, although it did distinguish the party from a number of other more durable organizations such as the KPRF, LDPR, Yabloko and the incarnations of Russia’s Choice.

Finally, WR was charged with being overly sympathetic to the Presidents’ radical market reform agenda. Wyman et. al. focus on both the lack of coherence within the party’s program and also its support for the President. They write, “Lakhova, a doctor who came from the same part of Russia as Eltsin and who had organized a commission on women, the family and demography within his administration. It was, in this sense, the female half of the ‘party of power,’ yet it had also supported a move by the Communists and Agrarians to halt the process of ‘privatization’” (Wyman p. 772). The conclusion may be colored by Lakhova herself who retained her position as Yeltsin’s advisor on women, health and family issues through her tenure in the Duma and was seen as being much more radical than the faction and who sharply criticized Fedulova’s efforts to guide the faction.

In addition, WR struggled to walk the line between Western-style feminism and a gender neutral appeal to voters. Sperling (1999) reports that relationship between WR and other women’s organizations were strained over the relatively neutral stance the party took in its campaign materials.

Despite these conflict, when compared to its rivals the WR faction does not seem to have badly bungled its opportunity to influence policy. The 1993-1995 legislative session was chaotic for all factions. As such, this contrast raises significant questions about the efficacy of claims of mismanagement as the sole explanation for WR’s loss of electoral support. Against the chaotic first session of the new parliament, it seems unlikely that voters would be paying close attention to many of these indicators of mismanagement or that WR would stand out. The next section of paper explores the more nuanced story of party-voters linkages: that WR struggled to forge effective ties to voters on the basis of descriptive or substantive representation largely because of the challenges of the legislative party system.

Testing Theories of Representation: Legislative Decision Making and Party-voter linkages

These indicators of factional mismanagement don’t seem to be sufficient to explain WR’s vote loss when contrasted with other parties but they do raise significant questions about the party’s capacity to forge ties to voters on the basis of descriptive or substantive representation. Two possibilities arise: the first is that these factional pathologies common to a number of legislative factions have different effects on different party organizations. The second is that these factional pathologies are mute if organizations can demonstrate to voters that they have influence policy consistent with their interest.

Viewed through the lens of theories of descriptive representation, these charges might go to the heart of the central functions that Mansbridge (1999) identifies as key to maintaining electoral support. In other words, it is possible that the widespread view that the party was poorly managed would be more damaging to a gendered party such as WR because of its strong descriptive linkages that were unique to the gender-based party organization.
This may explain why the same pathologies of factional politics, were more damaging to a gendered party than they were to other types of organizations.

On this score, two issues stand out that might weaken party-voter linkages rooted in descriptive representation: discord in the party’s policy agenda and the relationship between WR’s deputies and other female representatives in the Duma. In terms of latent issue agreement and the promotion of a group-identified agenda, there is some strong evidence that WR found it difficult to fulfill the core functions of descriptive representation. The party struggled to define itself both in the campaign period and in the legislative process as it walked a very fine line between Western feminist thought, which was seen as radical by most voters and a non-gendered identity that focused on human rights and a strong social safety net. While the party managed to form and staff a new parliamentary committee, the Committee on Women, Family and Youth, WR had some notable policy failures, including the introduction of gender quotas into electoral rules. To further explore these issues, we turn to innovative measurement tools derived from the theory of majority rule outcomes, the uncovered set.

Our analysis is framed using the spatial theory of legislator behavior, where individual preferences and policy outcomes are described using a multi-dimensional policy space (Austen-Smith and Banks 1999). In doing so, we are following the standard in legislative studies, where, “The spatial model of policy-making has become the workhorse model in the study of legislative institutions. Its stark parsimony makes tractable the analysis of a number of institutional arrangements” (McCarty and Cutrone 2006, 181).

In particular, our analysis relies on two theoretic tools. First, we use Optimal Classification software to recover two-dimensional ideal points from legislators’ roll call votes in 1994, 1998, and 2002. These ideal points capture legislators’ policy preferences on two dimensions, one capturing differences along the canonical left-right, government vs. markets dimension, the other describing a legislator’s position on issues relating to relations with the West. As an example, figure one shows ideal points for legislators in the 1994 Duma.

The ideal points in this figure are consistent with descriptive analyses of the chaotic environment observed in the Duma as well as the relative policy positions of different legislative factions. The parties appear in a large cloud positioned in the center of the political space. Roughly speaking, most legislators hold center-left preferences, with the KPRF and Agrarians arrayed on the left-hand side of the figure. WR takes a position very close to the KPRF/Agrarian parties. The pro-market parties, such as Yabloko, are on the right. The left-center positioning of parties underscores the degree to which most factions were advocating support of a social safety net in response to the market reforms introduced by the Yeltsin regime through presidential decree—the position advocated by WR. Moreover, the clustered nature of preferences across factions reflects the disarray in the first convocation of the Duma.

With preference data in hand, the next step is to measure the collective preference of each party as well as measure the influence of these organizations. We use the uncovered set calculated from a party’s deputies’ ideal points as the theoretically appropriate measure of the party’s collective preference. In generating the uncovered set of the ideal points of WR and other party factions—what we call the party UCS— as a measure of the party’s collective preference, we are not assuming that parties follow a specific voting procedure to arrive at a set of legislative goals. Instead, we employ the party UCS as many previous analyses have employed the median voter theorem to argue that whatever process of consultation, compromise, or voting is used,
the only outcomes that will emerge are uncovered outcomes. As a result, we can compare a party’s uncovered set to that of the entire legislature, other party factions, or other groups of deputies to see if the collective preference of party members differs from that of other legislative groups. These measures allow us to explore the degree to which the WR legislative faction was able to fulfill the functions and project the attributes central to mechanisms of descriptive and substantive representation.

Figure 2 reports the dispersion of the ideal points of the WR deputies. As the figure shows, WR deputies are both widely dispersed in the space and the party UCS, echoing the messages of party discipline described above. The finding speaks to the degree to which the party had the ability to accurately and clearly reflect the issues of core voters consistent with a theory of descriptive representation. Descriptive representation demands that the party reflect a clear and coherent set of policies that are recognizable to its core constituency. As the previous discussion indicates, both the historical roots of the party, the lack of agreement within the leadership and the lack of party discipline all undermined such efforts. This linkage is confirmed by the ideal point analysis at the degree that women voters look for a reflection of their own positions in the party, sends a very unclear signal with its behavior in the parliament.

Figure 3.

In addition to a clear symbol of common interest, a descriptive linkage requires that a party be a unique provider of the attributes of resemblance that resonate with core voters—a path to representation and the legitimization of voters’ grievances. For women’s parties, this implies that WR elect the large majority of women deputies and more importantly, key women leaders in order that they become the gateway for gender representation. Few studies focus on the fact that WR was neither the sole representative of women’s issues in the parliament or the sole source of female deputies. This perspective raises a series of important questions: Did these individuals hold policy preferences that were distinct from colleagues in other parties? Were women legislators from WR distinct from women in other parties? Any claim for gender-based descriptive representation would argue that WR was not only a tightly cohesive group but also not challenged by women deputies from competing organizations. This identity-based representation would constitute a first step in a WR brand that could attract a broader share of the women vote. WR was particularly vulnerable to like-minded parties nominating female deputies—a strategy pursued by the KPRF on the lead up to the 1995 election.

Figure 3.
these deputies more consistently voted for policies that advocated greater income distribution and state intervention in the economy.

The plot underscores two important points. First, WR was not a monopoly provider of descriptive representation for women. Some high profile women politicians joined other parties; other ran as independents under the mixed electoral rules. Thus, even to prominent women, WR did not provide an exclusive path to office or women’s participation in the formal process. Second, to the degree that there was congruence among these women deputies, the WR representatives did vote more consistently with the right/reform parties than the women who were members of the left opposition organizations, the KPRF and LDPR. As such, the party did not appear to legitimize the grievances of women harmed by President Yeltin’s shock therapy program. Rather it more frequent resembled the position of parties that were not in direct opposition to the president.

In fact, WR’s party-based representation of issues of great concern to women suffering from the dislocation of rapid economic transition was challenged by other parties on the right and left. Figure four

Figure 4.

WR had limited capacity to link to voters based on a descriptive logic based on its legislative action. The party’s monopoly over access to the system was challenged by other parties who nominated female candidates as well as prominent independents who managed to win office without joining any party organization. In addition, the disparate voting records within the party muddled its message, obscuring the policy congruence between voters and deputies. Likewise, the position of the party in the policy space mitigated the degree to which it appeared to legitimize the concerns of women struggling in the face of rapid economic transformation. Likewise, the party’s position within the legislative policy space was impinged on one side by the KPRF and on the right by Yabloko.

However, given the party’s experience in the legislature between founding elections and the 1995 contest, it is possible that the party would shift its strategy and appeal to voters on the basis of substantive representation. To do so, the party would have to credibly claim that it exerted significant influence over policy that was consistent with the preferences of its core voters—disadvantaged women. As the analysis below shows, this was not the case.

The Cornerstone of Substantive Representation: Party Relevance

Theories of substantive representation move from requiring that parties resemble core constituencies to demanding that they actually influence the legislative decision-making process in order to affect policy. To begin to think about policy outcomes, we can use the UCS technology to think about the relationship between the set of feasible policy outcomes defined by WR, the outcomes defined by other women within the parliament, and the set of possible outcomes that would be yielded by the chamber as a whole. For instance, was WR membership a good predictor of party preferences? Is gender a good predictor of preference? And finally, was the set of policy outcomes possible within the legislature consistent with the outcomes that defined by our single party of interest.

Figure five presents uncovered sets for three groups: the entire chamber, only WR legislators, and only women in the 1994 Duma elected from other parties.

Figure 5.
Using our ideal point estimates and uncovered set technology, we calculate party relevance scores for all parties represented in the 1994, 1998, and 2002 Duma. These scores are plotted in figure five, with the relevance score on the \( y \)-axis and the size of a party's legislative cohort on the \( x \)-axis. A hollow diamond denotes a party that did not elect legislators to the next Duma (after the 1995, 1999, or 2003 election, respectively).

Comparison of the uncovered sets among these three groups of policymakers confirms our earlier assertions. The WR uncovered set is relatively large, reflecting the differences in preferences within the party. The difference between the uncovered sets for WR and for women from other parties confirms the relatively unimportance of gender as a predictor of policy preferences. And finally, while the WR uncovered set is distinct (and larger) compared to the chamber uncovered set, it is no more so than uncovered sets from other parties – a finding which reinforces our earlier argument that WR was unable to build a party brand name that distinguished its goals from those held by other legislators, or from the set of likely policy outcomes in the Duma.

Two patterns are immediately apparent from Figure Six. First, while relevance is clearly correlated with size, the relationship is far from perfect, and breaks down for moderately sized party cohorts (\(< 50 \) or so). Thus, the relatively small size of the WR cohort is not a sufficient explanation for its lack of influence over policy outcomes.

Second, the figure confirms our expectation that parties with low relevance scores are more likely to exit the Duma compared to parties with higher relevance scores. This finding is most evident if we compare relatively small parties like WR to larger organizations like United Russia in 2002. But more importantly, even along relatively small Duma parties, relevance is clearly a predictor of a party's future electoral fate – parties with lower relevance scores are more likely to disappear compared to organizations with higher relevance scores. The clear implication is that a lack of influence over policy outcomes translates into declining electoral fortunes, as ambitious politicians and policy-minded voters abandon the party for organizations that appear to have greater influence.
As a whole our analysis shows that WR’s legislative behavior undermined its ability to appeal to voters either on the basis of or on the basis of policy influence. While we cannot distinguish which of these factors was most detrimental to its core voter support in 1995, it is likely that a mix of these failures dissuaded some voters to abandon the party for its competitors.

**WR, Party Relevance and Durability:**

**The Implications of the Analysis for Party System Development**

Theories of democratic consolidation argue that the introduction of competition in the first rounds of elections will weed out irrelevant party organizations. Yet, little is known about how this winnowing process works or, more precisely, what factors can effectively predict party durability. In this paper, we highlight the pressures that parties face to shift their electoral logic between founding elections and subsequent contests. Following founding elections, the party’s activity in the parliament has significant implications for the ways in which it can appeal to its vote base and to try to expand electoral support. For most organizations, this change in the political context of elections forces them to abandon or supplement appeals rooted in descriptive representation and move toward.

We then use an innovative theory and measurement tool, the UCS, to explore the ability of a single party to adjust to its own success. The WR case is particularly interesting for this analysis because it is a gender-based party, appealing to a single social group, women. As such, it is a party organization that faces significant choices about how to appeal to that constituency. The party can persist in building descriptive linkages; attract electoral support based on policy success or engage in a mix of appeal to voters, resting both on descriptive attributes and policy success. Our analysis shows that the party’s legislative behavior constrained its ability to make credible claims to represent women in either of these logics. Moreover, the analysis shows that this was not entirely due to mismanagement of the party’s resources between elections. Instead, the organization of the legislative party system coupled with the size of the party made it difficult for WR to assert itself in the policy process. Our analysis confirms Fedulova’s conclusion, that given the conditions in Russian between 1993 and 1995, there was no logic for women’s representation.

In this paper, we explore a single case, the rise and fall of WR, to understand the dynamics of gender-based representation in Russia but also to begin to clarify the conditions under which political parties endure through early competition. We invoke a simple model of electoral representation to guide our analysis, predicting that parties that can successfully claim to influence legislative decision-making (i.e., that have positive relevance) on behalf of their constituents will win vote support in the next round or they can adopt legislative strategies that allow for linkages rooted in descriptive representation.

In both cases, the party’s capacity to make linkages was not shaped only by the party’s own choices. This analysis underscores that the interactive or strategic nature of legislative decision-making also strongly influenced the party’s capacities to forge linkages to voters. In other words, the outcome of founding elections reverberates through the consolidation of party system and subsequently, into the regime structure.

**Conclusions**

While there is much direct gender discrimination that shapes women’s representation in Russia, these factors did not directly influence the rise and fall of WR. Our analysis suggests that Fedulova was right: in the context of the Russian party system the WR party was neither distinct nor important for determining legislative outcomes. There was no supporting logic for a gender-based party organization either in terms of descriptive representation or policy-based substantive representation.

Based on this analysis, we argue the voters’ decisions to desert the party in 1995 reflected the functioning of a simple electoral model of democracy. WR failed to deliver on campaign promises and was not likely to be able to alter their level of influence in the next convocation of the Duma. Russian women voters who supported the party in 1993 moved on to larger and seemingly more effective organizations that might better represent their interests. Yet, this explanation is not gendered – it is simple electoral arithmetic. Given the lack of party discipline WR did not pursue a clear policy program. However, the lack of polarization in the first session of the Duma coupled with the fragmented legislative party system rendered all organizations relatively ineffective in the decision process. Under these conditions, party brands were built on other factors that can be teased out through careful study. In the case, the inability of WR to corner the market on women’s representation probably influenced vote choice. In the next Duma session, the party system became increasingly polarized and was less fragmented. As a result, individual organizations, in particular the KPRF, emerged as relevant for the policy process. By 2002, Unity/United Russia achieved an extremely high relevance scores paving the way to electoral landslides in 2003 and 2007. It is not surprising that by 2010 these two parties, together with the LDPR, are the only founding parties still operating in the political landscape. And the logic of the LDPR remains beyond explanation.

In the bigger picture, our analysis suggests that party system structure may profoundly influence which parties survive the first rounds of competitive elections in new democracies. To date, these variables have not been central.
to explanations of party durability. While much work remains to be done, this analysis constitutes a first step in understanding the effect of structural factors on party viability in the wake of founding elections.

Endnotes

1. In the spatial model of legislative policy-making, the preferences of legislators and policy alternatives are represented as points in space. The extent to which a particular policy alternative is attractive for a particular legislator is a function of the distance between his or her ideal point and the policy option in this space. The usual assumption is that there is a set N of n legislators and that each legislator i ∈ N has Euclidean preferences defined by an ideal point. We say that one alternative, x ∈ X, beats another possible alternative, y ∈ X, if x is closer than y to more than half of the ideal points. That is, there is a majority coalition that prefers x to y and can enforce it. A core alternative is one that is unbeaten by all other alternatives. That is, there is no majority of the legislators that can agree to replace a core point with any other alternative. When a core exists, it is the clear manifestation of majority rule. One of the fundamental results of social choice theory, however, is that a core rarely exists in multi-dimensional, majority voting games (McKelvey 1976, 1979; Schofield 1978; McKelvey and Schofield, 1986, 1987). While these results have led many scholars to conclude that the outcomes of majority rule in multiple policy dimensions are indeterminate, subsequent theoretical work has found the uncovered set imposes significant constraints on majority rule outcomes even in the absence of a core (Miller 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1984; McKelvey 1986; Cox 1987). When the core is empty, alternatives may be divided into two sets: the covered set and the uncovered set. We say that x covers y if x beats y and if any third point z that beats x also beats y. If x covers y, then y is not only defeated by x, it is defeated by any alternative that beats x. The uncovered set (UCS) is the set of alternatives that are not covered.

2. The roll call data was obtained from Professor Thomas Remington at Emory University, while the classification software was obtained from Professor Keith Poole’s website, Vote View, www.voteview.com.

References


